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GIORA HON* 
TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ERRORS: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEW 
There is no such thing as a classification of the ways in which men may arrive at an 
error; it is much to be doubted whether there ever can be.’ 
A. de Morgan (1847) 
Abstract - This paper is concerned with the problem of experimental error. The 
prevalent view that experimental errors can be dismissed as a tiresome but trivia1 
blemish on the method of experimentation is criticized. It is stressed that the 
occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes a permanent feature of the attempt to 
test theories in the physical world, and this feature deserves proper attention. It is 
suggested that a classification of types of experimental error may be useful as a 
heuristic device in studying the nature of these errors. However, the standard 
classification of systematic and random errors is mathematically based and as such 
does not focus on the causes of the errors, their origins, or the contexts in which they 
arise. A new typology of experimental errors is therefore proposed whose criterion is 
epistemological. This typology reflects the various stages that can be discerned in the 
execution of an experiment, each stage constituting a category of a certain type of 
experimental error. The proposed classification consists of four categories which are 
illustrated by historical cases. 
1. General Discussion 
IN HIS BOOK, Mathematical Elements or Natural Philosophy Conjirm’d by 
Experiments, which he intended as an introduction to Newton’s natural 
philosophy, Gravesande (1688-1742) - the propounder of Newtonian physics 
on the Continent - demands that nature should be examined ‘attentively and 
incessantly . . . with indefatigable Pains. That Way’, he maintains, ‘our Pro- 
gress will be but slow, but then our discoveries will be certain’; indeed, in his 
view, even the limits of human understanding could thus be determined.* 
‘What has led most People into Errors’, he observes, ‘is an immoderate Desire 
of Knowledge, and the Shame of confessing our Ignorance. But Reason should 
get the better of that ill-grounded Shame; since’, as he writes - perhaps under 
the influence of Cusanus - ‘there is a learned Ignorance that is the Fruit of 
Knowledge, and which is much preferable to an ignorant Learning’.3 Although 
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Gravesande admits that many things in nature are hidden from US,~ he 
nevertheless holds that ‘what is set down in Physics, as a Science, is 
undoubted’.5 Thus, notwithstanding his explicit awareness of the limits and 
faults of human understanding, Gravesande does hold that the results of 
physics are certain. 
According to Gravesande it is the method of mathematical demonstration 
- a method which the physicist of the scientific revolution employs to deduce, 
and thus to explain, ‘from a few general Principles numberless particular 
Phenomena or Effects” - that furnishes physics with certainty. ‘Whoever will 
go about that Work any other Way, than by Mathematical Demonstrations, 
will be sure’, Gravesande warns, ‘to fall into Uncertainties at least, if not into 
Errors’.7 In his view, this way, the method of mathematical demonstration, is 
in fact the Newtonian method. 
Gravesande is explicit about the trust he invests in the Newtonian method. 
‘Philosophers’, he observes, ‘do not equally agree upon what is to pass for a 
Law of Nature, and what Method is to be followed in Quest of those Laws’.’ 
However, for Gravesande there is no doubt that one ought to follow the 
Newtonian method. And he maintains that ‘whoever will seriously examine, 
what Foundation this Method of Physics is built upon, will easily discover this 
to be the only true one, and that all Hypotheses are to be laid aside’.’ 
The great innovation of Gravesande is the attempt to illustrate, as he writes, 
‘every Thing by Experiments, and to set the very Mathematical Conclusions 
before the Reader’s Eyes by this Method’.‘* Although he admits that ‘Mathe- 
maticians think Experiments superfluous, where Mathematical Demon- 
strations will take Place’,” he has no doubt - since the mathematical 
conclusions are abstract - that it is easier to grasp these conclusions ‘when 
Experiments set [them] forth . . before our Eyes’.” 
This display of confidence should be contrasted with the cautious advice 
which Einstein gave the young Heisenberg in the spring of 1926. ‘You must 
appreciate’, Einstein instructed Heisenberg, ‘that observation is a very compli- 
cated process’.‘3 The phenomenon under observation, Einstein explained, 
4 ‘sGravesande, ibid., pp. xii-xiii. 
5 Ibid., p. xiii. 
6 ibid. 
’ Ibid. 
8 Ibid., p. ix. 
‘) Ibid., p. xvii. Gravesande perceives this method as a two-stage procedure; first there is the 
deduction of the laws of nature from the phenomena and, second, there is a process of induction to 
prove the generality of the deduced laws. (Ibid.) 
” Ibid. 
” Ibid., p. xviii. 
I* Ibid. Gravesande seems to go here beyond Newton by introducing some Cartesian elements 
into Newton’s methodology. The notion that experiment is a didactic aid has many undertones of 
the rationalism of Descartes. 
” Heisenberg (1971) p. 63. 
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produces certain events in our measuring apparatus. As a result, further processes 
take place in the apparatus, which eventually and by complicated paths produce 
sense impressions and help us to fix the effects in our consciousness. Along this 
whole path - from the phenomenon to its fixation in our consciousness - we must 
be able to tell how nature functions, must know the natural laws at least in practical 
terms, before we can claim to have observed anything at all.14 
In other words, even when we execute this basic requisite of science, namely 
observation, we ought to be explicitly aware of the assumptions involved. 
According to Einstein, we must be aware of the fact that while taking 
observations we assume, even if we are about to formulate a new law of nature 
which contradicts the old ones, that the current laws - believed to cover the 
whole path from the phenomenon to our consciousness - function in such a 
way that we can rely upon them. I5 The possibility of one such law being 
incorrect or the ‘chain’ which leads from the phenomenon to the observer’s 
consciousness being faulty, should not of course be ruled out. 
Although Einstein would presumably have agreed with Gravesande about 
the power of mathematical demonstrations in physics, he would not have 
considered the results of these demonstrations certain. Einstein succinctly 
formulated this view with the maxim that ‘as far as the proposition of 
mathematics refer to reality, they a-e not certain; and as far as they are certain, 
they do not refer to reality’.16 Experimental error is a recurring feature of the 
attempt to test the results of these demonstrations in the physical world. As 
Morris Cohen remarks, 
everyone who has ever worked in a laboratory or with instruments of precision 
knows that the simple laws of nature, so clearly formulated in elementary and 
popular treatises, are never verified with absolute accuracy. The results of actual 
measurements always differ.” 
It is a standard practice to attribute this lasting descrepancy between the 
theoretical formulae and the actual results of measurements not to some faults 
in the theory but rather to the ‘error’ of the instruments. However, the 
refinement and improvement of the available instruments never eliminate the 
discrepancy between theory and experiment. ‘On the contrary’, Cohen con- 
cludes, ‘it often compels us to abandon the simple law in favour of a more 
complicated one’.18 
Yet there is a prevalent belief that exact agreement can be attained. Jeffreys 
suggests that the use of the expression ‘exact science’ and the scarcity of 
explicit statements in popular works on physics concerning the imperfection of 
I* Ibid. 
” The thrust of Einstein’s argument is directed against the view that none but observable 
magnitudes must go into a physical theory. In Einstein’s view, ‘it is quite wrong to try founding a 
theory on observable magnitudes alone. Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, enables 
US to deduce the underlying phenomena from our sense impressions.’ (Ibid.) 
I6 Einstein (1921) p. 228. 
” M. R. Cohen (1949), p. 224. 
” Ibid.; cf., Duhem (1974), pp. 168-179. 
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agreement between physical laws and observation, have contributed to this 
misleading belief. Where errors of observation are mentioned at all they are 
dismissed, in Jeffreys’ words, ‘as a minor complication’.” Sellars’ casual 
remark that ‘once [errors of measurement and other forms of experimental 
error]. . have been discounted, our attention can turn to the logico-mathema- 
tical structure’,20 epitomizes this attitude towards the problem of error. Indeed, 
with a few exceptions,2’ the problem of error has been treated as quite 
incidental to the pursuits of science: ‘a tiresome but trivial excrescence on the 
neat deductive structure of science’.22 
” Jeffreys (1973) p. 63. Jeffreys observes that a typical presentation in textbooks of physics starts 
by stating a set of laws, taken as fundamental, and proceeds to develop a series of consequences - 
the observational evidence being only incidental. This approach is unsatisfactory and indeed 
misleading since it takes no account of errors; if the results were compared with observation 
directly, almost every law would be rejected. As Jeffreys remarks, ‘the observed value hardly ever 
agrees exactly with prediction, and the laws are taught as if they were exact.. [this treatment] is 
essentially inapplicable unless it is supplemented by the notion of error’. (Ihid., p. 80.) In Jeffreys’ 
view ‘the laws of physics, so far as they relate to observations. become statements of probability 
distributions. The quantities of physics arise fundamentally as parameters in these probability 
distributions.’ (I&f.) The principal objective of Jeffreys is to show that ‘errors of observation have 
to be considered in the process of establishment of the laws: we can, if we like, say that there is a 
form of the law that expresses exact relations between true values, but the law that is verified is a 
modification of this that takes account of probabilities of errors of observation in different ranges’. 
(Ibid.. p. 212.) Jeffreys points out that there are three fundamental misconceptions which pervade 
most modern accounts of scientific principles and are the principal source of confusion. ‘The first is 
that in some sense scientific laws are statements made with certainty. The second is that physical 
measures can be exact. The third is that there is a clearly marked boundary between science and 
ordinary thought.’ (Ibid., p. 183.) According to Jeffreys, the second fallacy arises from ignoring the 
occurrences of observational errors. Jeffreys’ general objective is to show how the first two fallacies 
are avoided by the theory of probability. 
lo Sellars (1961), p. 73: quoted by Mellor (1965), p. 106. 
2’ Chwistek (1948). According to Chwistek, measurement is a crudely defined activity. Since 
slight differences in the results of a measurement are disregarded, a measurement can give no basis 
for the establishment of a one to one correspondence between its results and a real number. In 
other words, as he writes, ‘many real numbers correspond to one measurement and the class of real 
numbers is not precisely determined. The only way to make this statement more precise is to fix the 
limits between which the number obtained by measurement can vary, i.e. to designate two 
numbers, between which the number obtained by measurement may be found’. (Ibid., p. 256.) The 
thrust of Chwistek’s criticism is that ‘the concept of ideal length is meaningless and that experience 
furnishes not determinate numbers but classes of numbers which lie between certain limits’. (Ibid., 
p. 257.) Presumably, Chwistek would have agreed with Born’s claim that ‘statements like “A 
quantity x has a completely definitive value” (expressed by a real number and represented by a 
point in the mathematical continuum) seem.. to have no physical meaning’. (Born, 1956, p. 167.) 
22 Mellor (1967), p. 6. Striven’s view is a subtle example of this attitude; while acknowledging 
that laws of nature are virtually all known to be in error, he concludes that since ‘they represent 
great truths. we forgive them their errors’. (Striven, 1961, pp. 91, 101.) Mellor is in fact a critic of 
this attitude. In a series of papers published in Philosophy of Science (Mellor, 1965, 1966, 1967), he 
‘tried to show how the effects of experimental error or imprecision can be accommodated within a 
testable, deductive scientific structure’. (Mellor, 1965, p. 121.) There is now a growing interest in 
the critical examination of the acrual practice of the scientific method in general and the method of 
experimentation in particular. Different perspectives are taken: from an internal analytical point of 
view to sociological reconstructions and anthropological studies. See for example the following 
works: Franklin (1987); Franklin and Howson (1984, 1988); Cartwright (!984); Hacking (1983); 
Pickering (1984); Gooding (1981); Gooding (1982); Galison (1985, 1987); Latour and Woolgar 
(1979). For a rich bibliography see the editorial in Isis: Sturchio (1988). As Pickering demands, 
‘experimental techniques, methods, and procedures - the very stuff of empirical science - should 
not be treated as unproblematic adjuncts of some higher theoretical exercise’. (Pickering 1981, 
p. 235.) 
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Jeffreys emphatically states that ‘exact agreement between physical laws and 
observation was never attained’,23 and he criticizes the exaggerated attention 
which the uncertainty principle has attracted. Although ‘the uncertainties 
treated in the quantum theory are far smaller than any of the discrepancies 
between previous theories and observational results . . . these [discrepancies]‘, 
Jeffreys remarks, ‘had attracted little attention from philosophers’.24 J. 0. 
Wisdom indeed claims that ‘all the standard philosophies of science that have 
been current in this century fail to solve the problem of the data-theory gap’.25 
The experimenter however constantly encounters these discrepancies 
between theories and observational results; indeed, part of his or her daily 
routine consists, as M. Polanyi intimates, in explaining away these discrepan- 
cies. ‘In my laboratory’, Polanyi writes, 
I find the laws of nature formally contradicted at every hour, but I explain this away 
by the assumption of experimental error. I know that this may cause me one day to 
explain away a fundamentally new phenomenon and to miss a great discovery. Such 
things have often happened in the history of science. Yet I shall continue to explain 
away my odd results, for if every anomaly observed in my laboratory were taken at 
its face value, research would instantly degenerate into a wild-goose chase after 
imaginary fundamental novelties.26 
Focusing our attention on these discrepancies we see that their origins can 
be of different kinds: occurring in different contexts and arising from different 
P Jeffreys (1973), p. 183. 
” Ibid., pp. 63-64. Evidently, the attraction of the uncertainty principle is due to the very fact 
that it is indeed a principle: a fundamental limitation on the accuracy with which one can execute a 
measurement independent of one’s experimental skill. There is, however, a phenomenon which is 
associated with classical physics that sets a definite limit to the ultimate sensitivity of measuring 
instruments beyond which one cannot advance, namely Brownian motion, (Ising, 1926; Barnes 
and Silverman, 1934.) To be sure, classical physics is based on idealization which can be valid only 
under the assumption that absolute accuracy is within reach; that is, that mathematical accuracy 
can be attained with respect to the initial state of the physical system involved. F. Waismann takes 
stock of this classical attitude; he remarks that ‘the accuracy of any measurement, it was supposed 
-~ rather light-heartedly as it would seem now - could be increased to any degree by improved 
technique. L-respective of whether absolute precision will ever be attainable with our blunt 
instruments, we can at any rate go on refining our measuring methods, it was assumed, and 
proportionally our predictions concerning the future will become more and more reliable. That 
there is no Iimir to this approach, this was, ultimately, the tacit assumption underlying classical 
physics, and one so brilliantly vindicated by the successes in astronomy’. (Waismann, 1959, 
p. 107.) Waismann associates the decline of causality with the recognition of ‘how utterly Utopian 
the idea of absolute precision is’; (Ibid., p. 112) and the fall of causality with the discovery of the 
uncertainty principle. (Ibid.) 
I5 Wisdom (1971) p. 281. Wisdom argues that ‘the fundamental assumption that sets the 
problem for. all three approaches [instrumentalism, conventionalism and classical induction], is 
the giveness of observations; observations are simply there, as the empiricist tradition has it, 
waiting to be recorded by that classical camera obscura, the human mind. In other words, they 
share a philosophy of observationalism’. (Ibid.) On the gap between mathematical accuracy and 
physical approximation see also Duhem (1974), pp. 132-143; cf., Mellor (1965), pp. 110-l 11; 
Laymon (1985). 
26 Polanyi (1964), p. 31. Polanyi concludes that ‘just as there is no proof of a proposition in 
natural science which cannot conceivably turn out to be incomplete, so also there is no refutation 
which cannot conceivably turn out to have been unfounded. There is a residue of personal 
judgement required in deciding - as the scientist eventually must - what weight to attach to any 
particular set of evidence in regard to the validity of a particular proposition’. (Ibid.) 
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causes. To clarify this complex array of different causes it is useful to have, as a 
heuristic device, a system of classification of experimental error. 
The most common classification of experimental error is the classification 
which distinguishes between two categories of error: systematic and random 
errors. As we shall see, this is not the kind of classification needed for our 
purposes. 
Systematic errors, as their name indicates, systematically obstruct the 
measurement from reaching the intended actual value by shifting the result - 
either positively or negatively - by a magnitude which may be constant or 
may vary in some regular fashion. By contrast, random errors are disordered 
in their incidence and vary accidentally in their magnitude. A simple example 
of the former is an incorrect calibration of the measuring instrument; undue 
mechanical vibrations of the equipment - vibrations which interfere with the 
measurement - constitute a cause of the latter.27 
The distinction between the terms accuracy and precision - terms which are 
mistakenly used interchangeably - corresponds to this dichotomy between 
systematic and random errors. Accuracy refers to the closeness of the measure- 
ments to the ‘true’ value of the sought physical quantity, whereas precision 
indicates the closeness with which the measurements agree with one another 
independently of their relations to the ‘true’ value. Accuracy thus implies 
precision but the converse is not necessarily true.28 
In scientific and technical writings it is common to find different usages of 
the word error. One school of thought considers error the difference between 
the experimental result and the ‘true’ value; another usage is that error is the 
number placed in the statement of the result after the plus-or-minus sign, 
irrespective of the ‘true’ value. 29 It has been suggested - in a Code of Practice 
addressed to the National Physical Laboratory - to use the term uncertainty 
to cover this multiple usage of the word error.3o In this Code of Practice the 
uncertainty of a measurement is divided into two categories: the random 
uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty.l’ According to this Code, the 
estimation of random uncertainty is derived by a statistical analysis of repeated 
I’ See for example Topping (1975), p. 10; Parratt (1961), pp. 6469. 
28 Topping, ibid., p. 14; Parratt, ibid. Cf., Franklin (1981), p. 367. 
29 Campion et al. (1980), p. 25. At the time of publication, Campion was the Deputy Director of 
NPL. E. R. Cohen and J. W. M. DuMond observe in their 1965 review of the fundamental 
constants that there seem to be two completely incompatible ways in which experimenters regard 
experimental error. ‘Some regard the number following the sign of ambiguity as expressing “limits 
of error” with the unstated implication that the true value lies anywhere within the gap and that 
there is something rather virtuous in overestimating the magnitude of this gap “for safety” or “to 
take care of possible but unknown sources of systematic error”. Such an error estimate. is not 
a quantitative estimate, but a statement of inequality: the error is less than or equal to so-and-so 
much’. Cohen and DuMond in fact deplore this approach. (Cohen and DuMond, 1965, pp. 540- 
541.) 
j” Campion et al., ibid., pp. 1, 30. 
” Ibid., p. 1. 
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measurements while the estimation of systematic uncertainty is assessed by 
non-statistical methods and much depends on the judgement of the experi- 
menter in allocating limits to this uncertainty.32 
From a different perspective, Jeffreys has defined systematic errors as ‘errors 
that could be precisely calculated for each observation, given the values of 
certain parameters’.” Evidently, random errors do not have this feature. It 
thus appears that whatever the terms and the definitions, the methods used for 
estimating uncertainties constitute the underlying criterion of the dichotomy 
between systematic and random error. 
Many textbooks and manuals on the design of experiments and the treat- 
ment of data can attest to the general acceptance of this classification which is 
sometimes even considered exhaustive. Typically, it is claimed that the skilled 
experimenter can eliminate all systematic errors. Upon accomplishing this task 
the experimenter, it is further claimed, finds that there is still a margin of error 
which requires further consideration. This margin of error, it is asserted, is due 
to random errors.34 Thus, the experimenter is culpable when he or she commits 
so to speak systematic errors: the experimenter may be blamed for failing to 
eliminate systematic errors or to account for them, but he or she may not be 
blamed for the occurrence of random errors; the latter are inevitable and the 
experimenter is not liable for their occurrence. It is perhaps due to this clear- 
cut distinction between culpability and inevitability that this classification has 
become so attractive to experimenters, so much so that they have never set out 
to question its conventional foundation and accepted it without any reserva- 
tion. 
The advice offered to the skilled experimenter concerning the inevitable 
occurrence of random errors, is that 
32 Ibid., pp. 14-15, 23. 
33 Jeffreys (1973), p. 77 (my emphasis). 
M Cramer expresses this attitude in these words: ‘Obviously. [systematic errors] will not lend 
themselves to probabilistic treatment, and accordingly we shall assume in the sequel [i.e. Cramer’s 
treatise] that we are dealing with observations which are free from systematic errors’. (Cramer, 
1966, p. 229.) Cf., Worsnop and Flint (1951) p. 5; Young (1962), p. 3. Parratt describes faults such 
as mistakes in recording data and in calculation as outright mistakes and calls them blunders. 
(Parratt. 1961, p. 69.) Thomson and Tait assign these faults to a third class: the class of what they 
call avoidable mistakes. (Thomson and Tait, 1872, pp. 112-113.) Worsnop and Flint also call 
errors of this type mistakes. They use the term mistake to denote a fault of measurement or of 
observation which can be avoided by care on the part of the observer. Thus, they remark that 
‘inexperienced observers or observers not in a normal state [sic] make errors of varying magnitude 
which should strictly be described as mistakes’. (Worsnop and Flint, 1951, pp. 34.) Evidently the 
personal qualification of the experimenter is at the root of this usage of the term mistake. Worsnop 
and Flint distinguish further between constant and systematic errors. In their view, ‘constant 
errors are those which affect the results of a series of experiments by the same amount. An example 
is the case of the faulty graduation of a scale’. (Ibid., p. 4.) They maintain that these errors are 
distinct from systematic errors which ‘occur according to some definite rule, such as would be the 
case in readings on a circular scale if the pointer were not pivoted at the centre’. (Ibid.) However, 
this is not a categorical distinction; in fact by these very definitions, a constant error is a particular 
instance of systematic error. 
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it is found empirically that. . random errors are frequently distributed according to 
a simple law. This makes it possible to use statistical methods to deal with random 
errors.)5 
In sum, the standard view is that, apart from random errors, all experimen- 
tal errors can be eliminated, and that the distribution of random errors can be 
captured by a simple law, namely, the Normal law, which, it is claimed, has 
been established empirically. 
However, in practice it is very rarely, if ever, the case that the experimenter 
can remove the systematic errors altogether. In Duhem’s view the estimation of 
the degree of exactness of an experiment requires, among other things, that ‘we 
evaluate the systematic errors that could not be corrected; but, after making as 
complete an enumeration as possible of the causes of these errors, we are sure 
to omit infinitely more than have been enumerated, for the complexity of 
concrete reality is beyond US’.~~ 
Furthermore, the distribution of errors follows the Normal law only approxi- 
mately, even when the quantity to be measured is as steady as possible.37 
Although this approximation can be justified under much wider conditions, 
namely the central limit theorem, it is still the case, Jeffreys remarks, that these 
conditions ‘are seldom known to be true in actual applications. Consequently’, 
Jeffreys argues, ‘the normal law as applied to actual observations can be 
justified, in the last resort, only by comparison with the observations them- 
selves’.38 Needless to say, this is a vicious circle; it is the result of justifying the 
treatment of observations by exclusively referring to the observations them- 
selves. 
This state of affairs has led to much confusion with respect to the validity of 
the Normal law; a confusion to which Lippmann wittily referred in his remark 
to Poincark: 
Everybody believes in the exponential law of errors: the experimenters, because they 
think it can be proved by mathematics; and the mathematicians, because they believe 
it has been established by observation.39 
In the NPL’s Code of Practice, Campion et al. state quite clearly that ‘there is 
of course no reason for experimental observations to follow the Normal 
distribution exactly - it is a convenient mathematical expression which fits 
most of the experimental observations’.“(’ They stress that ‘it should be 
recognized that this is an assumption which may not always be justified’.4’ 
35 Young (1962), p. 3. 
j6 Duhem (1974), p. 162. 
37 Jeffreys (1973), p. 67. 
3x Ibid., emphasis in the original; cf., Cohen and DuMond (1965), pp. 540-541. 
I’) Quoted by Whittaker and Robinson (1924), p. 179. (See Poincart, Calcul des ProbabilitPs, 
p. 149.) 
4o Campion et al. (1980), p. 11. 
41 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Indeed, as Margenau critically remarks 
experience presents the scientist with innumerable skew distributions, differing 
perceptibly from the Normal law. These he often dismisses or corrects, because for 
some hitherto unstated reason he objects to them. He uses the normal distribution 
both as an inductive generalization from experience and as a criterion for the 
trustworthiness of that experience. Thus he is lifting himself by his bootstraps unless 
an independent argument can be given for the normalcy of that distribution.42 
The correct approach is ‘to regard the number following the plus-or-minus 
sign as an estimate of the width parameter of some’, and it should be stressed, 
some ‘statistical distribution of observed values which would be obtained if the 
measurement were replicated a number of times’.43 Clearly, the appeal to 
probability is an attempt to break the vicious circle. 
Two objections which are closely connected may be raised against this 
classification of systematic and random errors. First, as the protagonists of this 
classification are interested in the resultant error and not so much in its source, 
they are bound to classify together phenomena which may indeed perpetrate as 
it were the same kind of error, e.g. random error, but are nevertheless distinct 
as to their causes. Thus, for example, ‘small errors in judgement on the part of 
the observer, such as in estimating tenths of the smallest scale division’,@ are 
classified together with ‘unpredictable fluctuations in conditions, such as 
temperature. . . or mechanical vibrations of the equipment’.45 The implication 
of this arrangement is that errors which are peculiar to an individual observer 
are conflated with errors that have originated in the instrument. 
Grouping together such diverse sources of error obscures the nature of 
experimental error. To put it differently, the dichotomy between systematic 
and random errors does not focus on the source of the error; rather, it 
examines the nature of the error by applying a mathematical criterion. This 
criterion judges whether the estimation of the error is derived by a statistical 
analysis of repeated measurements or by non-statistical methods in which 
much depends on the judgement of the experimenter in allocating limits to the 
accuracy of the measurement. As we have seen, the former error will be 
random, the latter systematic. 
The fact that the criterion which underlies this dichotomy is mathematical 
constitutes the second objection. Most writers in this,field satisfy themselves 
with a few remarks concerning the origin and treatment of systematic errors. 
Having briefly dealt with systematic errors, these authors proceed to a detailed 
42 Margenau (1950) p. 114. 
4’ Cohen and DuMond (1965) p. 540. 
@ Young (1962), pp. 2-3. 
*5 Ibid., p. 3. For another example see Worsnop and Flint (1951) p. 4. They place errors which 
arise from instruments and external conditions such as temperature variation on an equal footing 
with those arising from personal idiosyncrasies, since all of these errors are in their view 
systematic. 
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analysis of the theory of error which provides the mathematical tool for 
treating random errors. However, under this treatment the error which we 
know to originate in a certain conceptual framework and under some physical 
conditions, is transformed into a technical term which is defined mathemat- 
ically as either the difference between the measurement results and the ‘true’ 
value, or the departure from the mean - the mean being another mathemat- 
ical concept designed to capture the plurality of the results. In this sense, errors 
are in effect residuals, as indeed Jeffreys calls them.4h 
The upshot of such analysis is that the experimenter gets a mathematical 
insight into his or her collection of data. Indeed, the object of the mathematical 
theory of error ‘is to work out methods for estimating the numerical values of 
the required magnitudes by means of a given set of observations, and also to 
make it possible for the observer to arrive at some conclusion with respect to 
the degree of precision of the estimates obtained’.47 In accordance with that 
theory the experimenter identifies the unknown ‘true’ value of the observed 
magnitude with the mean of the corresponding Normal distribution, and the 
degree of precision with the standard deviation of the distribution.48 Comment- 
ing on this theory of error, Margenau remarks that 
the philosopher of science is obliged to take note of this remarkable fact: both ‘truth’ 
and ‘tolerance’ must be fished out of the uncertainties of the immediately given by 
more or less arbitrary rules not immediately presented in Nature.49 
Be that as it may, the experimenter remains however in the dark as to the 
conceptual and physical circumstances in which the errors have originated.50 
To illuminate these aspects we shall treat experimental error as a twofold 
a Jeffreys (1973), p. 64. 
47 Cram& (1966), p. 229. 
48 Ibid., p. 230. In view of the fact that the mathematical theory is somewhat arbitrary, it is no 
surprise that there is no general agreement among scientists as to the adequacy of the standard 
deviation as a measure of precision, and that some other measures are being used, e.g. probable 
error. In their 1965 review of the fundamental constants, Cohen and DuMond state their 
preference for expressing all their error measures in terms of standard deviations: the root-mean- 
square deviations from the mean, rather than in terms of probable errors. In their view, ‘it is a 
grave mistake.. to regard the error expressed in standard deviations as simply differing by a 
multiplying factor (1.48) from the probable error. The probable error is defined as that measure of 
dispersion such that the odds are even that the observations may lie either inside or outside the 
given limits. Only for the Gaussian [i.e. Normal] distribution are the standard deviation and the 
probable error related to each other by the numerical factor just cited. They are two entirely 
different kinds of dispersion measures, and the standard deviation is far more general in its 
applicability under the theory of least squares’. (Cohen and DuMond, 1965, p. 541.) Campion et 
al. note in their Code of Practice that ‘the standard deviation depends only on the precision of the 
technique and apparatus used and, so long as these are not changed, it will not change significantly 
however many observations are taken; on the other hand, the standard error of the mean depends 
on the number of observations in the sample as well as on the precision of the technique. The two 
quantities. present different information’, conclude Campion et a/. and recommend that ‘the 
statement of both in a result may sometimes be appropriate’. (Campion ef al., 1980, p. 7.) 
49 Margenau (1950), p. 113. 
5” Cf. Duhem (1974), p. 162. 
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phenomenon consisting of conceptual and physical elements, and not as a 
mathematical abstraction. Indeed, it appears that these two elements are 
invariably interwoven: there is always a certain physical condition and the 
experimenter’s conceptual understanding of it. Most scientists and philoso- 
phers of science regard error as an essentially probabilistic phenomenon 
resulting from some stochastic process. 5’ Although the probabilistic approach 
is of considerable importance in coping with inaccuracy and imprecision, we 
are concerned here with error as an epistemological concept, and this view calls 
for a different classification of experimental error than the dichotomy of 
systematic and random error.52 
To arrive at a classification which focuses on the epistemological nature of 
experimental error, one has to distinguish between the different contexts in 
which error may arise, and within each context to determine the kind of 
possible reasons for an error to occur. 
I discern four distinct stages in the execution of an experiment: 
(1) laying down the theoretical framework of the experiment; 
(2) constructing the apparatus and making it work; 
(3) taking observations or readings; and, 
(4) processing the recorded data and interpreting them. 
Corresponding to these four stages we may classify experimental errors as 
arising in: 
(1) background theory; 
(2) assumptions concerning the actual set-up and its working; 
(3) observational reports; and, 
(4) theoretical conclusions. 
2.1. Background Theory 
Any attempt to create artificially certain physical conditions with a view to 
examining experimentally a particular phenomenon, indeed, even the making 
of the simplest observations, takes place within a theoretical framework which 
underpins the experimental inquiry and thus determines and directs it. This 
theoretical framework - the ‘background theory’ - is tentatively taken for 
granted and considered correct. The experiment, or for that matter the 
observation, is not designed to test or demonstrate the background theory; 
rather, the experimenter relies upon this theory to advance the physical 
Q Salmon, for example, holds that the concept of error is basically probabilistic. (Salmon, 1967, 
p. 65.) 
52 Historical studies of experimental error as a probabilistic concept have been carried out by L. 
Tilling (1973) and 0. B. Sheynin. Sheynin published a series of papers on this subject in the Archive 
for History of Exacr Sciences (see in particular his general historical essay, 1973). For a complete 
bibliography of his study see his 1983; cf., 1966. For an historical study of error as an 
epistemological phenomenon see Hon (1987b, 1989). 
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argument which he or she then puts to test. As Wittgenstein remarked, 
all testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already 
within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point 
of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an 
argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which 
arguments have their life.5’ 
The background theory is indeed ‘the element in which arguments have their 
iife’; it thus constitutes the first stage of the method of experimentation and 
therefore the first category in the present scheme of types of experimental 
error. 
One may clarify this point by making the simple observation of looking at a 
family photograph. Having examined such a photograph, one instantly recog- 
nizes the images which comprise it and is able to relate them in a confident 
fashion to the relatives one has come to know. It seems that such an exercise 
does not require the slightest effort: there is no need for the observer to 
consider the mechanical, optical and chemical theories which underlie the 
production of such an artefact. However, one can take this exercise to its 
extremes and consider an electron-micrograph and a radio-photograph trans- 
mitted, say, by a spacecraft such as Mariner; the theory in the background 
which was previously set aside must come now to the fore. Since one cannot be 
sure about the relation between the unfamiliar composition of images to the 
so-called ‘reality’ this composition is supposed to represent, one has to rely 
upon the background theory to ensure that the composition is indeed a faithful 
representation.j4 
Clearly, we can further distinguish within this class between the general 
theory and the instrumental theories which are assumed to govern the perfor- 
mance of the instruments intended for use in the experiment. Amongst these 
instrumental theories there is one theory which deserves a special attention, 
namely, the theory which underlies the set-up itself. This theory occupies, 
therefore, a subclass of its own in this category of background theory. It is in 
this primary stage of the experiment that the experimenter develops the theory 
of the set-up, plans its design and specifies the initial conditions. 
The experimental method can be generally characterized as a method which 
inquires into the nature of phenomena by varying a certain group of elements 
or a single one, and recording the change, if any, in some other elements. In 
fact, as Mach remarks, ‘what we can learn from an experiment resides wholly 
and solely in the dependence or independence of the elements or conditions of 
” Wittgenstein (1977), p. 16e (par. 105). 
54 Many difficulties may be raised with regard to the application of photographic techniques in 
scientific inquiries; prominent amongst them is the possibility of creating artefacts which do not 
represent faithfully the objects under study (e.g. problems in enhancement techniques). See also 
Hillman and Sartory (1977). For a positive view concerning electron-micrographs see Hacking 
(1983), pp. 186-209. Chap. 11: Microscopes. 
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a phenomenon’.55 In studying a particular agent or cause, the experimenter 
should seek to isolate the object of study. Thus, the design must be such as to 
increase the effects due to the object of study until these effects exceed 
considerably the unavoidable concomitants; the latter can then be considered 
as only disturbing these effects, and not essentially modifying them.56 In other 
words, the experimenter has to make the set-up most sensitive to the object of 
study and as insensitive as possible to all other elements that may play a part. 
As Weyl remarks, ‘this accounts, among other things, for the tedious efforts 
involved in screening off all kinds of “sources of error”.‘57 Evidently, the 
attainment of isolation is essential for achieving this goal. Indeed, the mark of 
a great experimenter is the ability to simplify the set-up in such a way that only 
the factor in question remains in evidence while all other influences become 
negligible.‘” 
In the background-theory stage of the experiment error may arise as a 
consequence of using false theory. Corresponding to the distinctions between 
the general theory, the instrumental theories and the theory of the set-up, we 
may determine one possible source of error as the falsity of one or more of 
these theories. However, it should be stressed that a false theory does not 
necessarily lead to an error in the final experimental result. One may develop 
the argument of an experiment within the framework of a false general theory 
and yet produce a correct result; one may use an instrument or even the 
apparatus itself without a proper theoretical understanding of its working, 
indeed its theory may be wrong or even missing altogether, and yet the overall 
result still be correct. As C. Bernard summed up this point, ‘even mistaken 
hypotheses and theories are of use in leading to discoveries. . . It seems, indeed, 
a necessary weakness of our mind to be able to reach truth only across a 
multitude of errors and obstacles’.59 
In addition to falsity as a source of error, error may occur in this stage when 
the theory is incomplete, or when it is correct in the main but false in some 
isolated aspect - a falsity which does not undermine the theory itself. 
Furthermore, in cases where the theory makes use of some external - either 
calculated or measured - constants, error may arise if these auxiliary elements 
are in error. 
A case in which use was made of a falsely calculated constant is related by 
Wood. Mach reported that in a treatise entitled Homes Without Hands, 
published in 1865, Wood relates the following episode: 
55 Mach (1976), p. 149; Chap. 12: Physical Experiment and Its Leading Features. 
56 Thomson and Tait (1872), p. 108. 
5’ Weyl (1963), p. 153. 
s” Mach (1976), p. 151. For further analyses of experiment see Franklin (1986) and Galison 
987). 
59 Bernard (1957), p. 170. 
Towards a Typology of Experimental Errors 483 
Maraldi had been struck with the great regularity of the cells of the honeycomb. He 
measured the angles of the. . . rhombs, that form the terminal walls of the cells, and 
found them to be respectively 109”28’ and 70”32’. Reaumur, convinced that these 
angles were in some way connected with the economy of the cells, requested the 
mathematician KGnig to calculate the form of a hexagonal prism terminated by a 
pyramid composed of three equal. . rhombs, which would give the greatest amount 
of space with a given amount of material. The answer was, that the angles should be 
109”26’ and 70”34’. The difference, accordingly, was two minutes. Maclaurin, 
dissatisfied with this agreement, repeated Maraldi’s measurements, found them 
correct, and discovered, in going over the calculation, an error in the logarithmic 
table employed by Kiinig. Not the bees, but the mathematicians were wrong, and the 
bees had helped to detect the error!60 
Mach went on to comment that 
any one who is acquainted with the method of measuring crystals and has seen the 
cell of a honeycomb, with its rough and non-reflective surfaces, will question 
whether the measurement of such cells can be executed with a probable error of only 
two minutes.61 
A clear example of an auxiliary measured-constant which introduced an 
error into the final experimental result is E. Harrington’s value for the viscosity 
of air, of which R. A. Millikan made use in his evaluation of e, the charge of 
the electron. Millikan gave much weight to Harrington’s result - Harrington 
was a colleague of Millikan - but the result was vitiated by several serious 
systematic errors.‘j2 Harrington’s value was too low by about 0.4% and 
consequently Millikan’s value of e was too low by about 0.6°h.63 As E. R. 
Cohen et al. observe, this error ‘remained completely unsuspected for a period 
of about 15 years [1916-1931]‘.61 
An illustration of an incomplete theory which resulted in a discrepancy 
between theory and observation is the discrepancy between Newton’s theoreti- 
cal value for the speed of sound in air and actual measurement of that speed. 
T. S. Kuhn points out that ‘this discrepancy, about twenty per cent, had been 
one of the scandals of physical science for more than a century and had 
repeatedly though fruitlessly drawn the attention of Europe’s outstanding 
theoretical scientists, including Euler and Lagrange’.65 When Laplace sug- 
M, ‘Mach (1974) p. 548; cf. Fleck (1979) pp. 32-33. 
+,’ Mach, ibid., p. 549. 
O2 E. R. Cohen et al. (1957), p. 116. In Millikan’s view, Harrington succeeded in making a 
determination of the viscosity of air which is ‘altogether unique in its reliability and precision. I 
give to it alone’, Millikan writes, ‘greater weight than to all the other work of the past fifty years in 
this field taken together. For the individual determinations, though made with different suspen- 
sions and in such a way as to eliminate all constant sources of error save the dimensions of the 
cylinders, never differ among themselves by as much as I per cent, and the error in the final mean 
can scarcely be more than one part in 2000’. (Millikan, 1917, p. 9.) 
63 In the evaluation of the charge e, the coefficient of viscosity enters to the 3/2 power. 
M E. R. Cohen et al. (1957), p. 116. 
es Kuhn (1958) pp. 136137. 
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gested around 1802 that heating by compression might account for this 
discrepancy, direct confirmation was not possible. The existing thermometers 
had such a large heat capacity that their slow response did not permit direct 
measurements. Competing some ten years later for the French Academy prize 
concerning this problem, Delaroche and Btrard did measure the heat capacity 
of air at two quite different pressures. From these measurements Laplace was 
able to derive the first good theoretical value for the speed of sound in air. By 
1825, Laplace succeeded in reconciling experiment and theory by using a new 
value for the speed of sound in addition to more direct data of adiabatic 
compression. 66 However, as Kuhn remarks, ‘in retrospect, the agreement was 
artificial. . . In this case, as in remarkably many others throughout this period, 
errors of theory and experiment compensated more than well enough to satisfy 
expectation’.67 
Michelson’s measurement of the velocity of light is an example of a correct 
set-up theory which contains an isolated mistake. In his 1941 review of the 
various determinations of c, the velocity of light in vacuum, Birge reported 
that 
Michelson’s published result of 299796 km/s is. . in need of revision. To obtain it he 
used 67 km/s for the correction to vacuum from air at an assumed average 
temperature of 20°C and at an average barometric pressure of 625 mm Hg. It is easy 
to show that his correction results from the use of the wave index of refraction, 
instead of the correct group index of refraction.68 
Birge remarked that ‘this is one of the most inexplicable errors that I have ever 
come across in the literature’.69 According to Birge, Michelson never applied 
the concept of group velocity in his work on the absolute value of c; indeed, 
‘Michelson did not even apply group velocity to his observed index for water. 
If he had, it would have spoiled the apparent agreement’.” Although Michel- 
bh Ibid., pp. 136-139. Specifically, Laplace showed that if gamma is defined as the ratio of the 
heat capacity of a gas at constant pressure to its capacity at constant volume, then the speed of 
sound must have Newton’s value multiplied by the square root of gamma. 
(17 Ibid., pp. 137-138. Kuhn remarks further that in the first half of the nineteenth century ‘the 
heat capacity of calorimeter and thermometer was usually far larger than that of the gas they 
contained. As a result, few empirical bench marks were available to those who developed the 
caloric theory of gases, and it was difficult to tell which of the available and by no means consistent 
experimental measurements was reliable. The selection and evaluation of empirical tests was as 
much a matter of taste and judgement as the selection and evaluation of theory’. (Ibid., p. 140). C. 
Truesdell disputes this historical analysis of Kuhn. According to Truesdell ‘Lagrange found a 
suitable fudge factor in the 176Os, which would probably satisfy a modern physicist but was not 
acceptable then because it had no basis in principle. Failure to find a theory that explains from a 
general standpoint a datum of experiment is not a scandal; rather, it is an impetus to progress. 
Many aspects of acoustics are dimensionless (nodal patterns and ratios, for example); they were 
developed with great skill in the eighteenth century by Taylor, Daniel Bernoulli, Euler, and others’. 
(I am grateful to C. Truesdell for this remark; cf., Truesdell, 1980, p. 30; Fox 1971.) 
Lx Birge (1941), p. 93. 
by Ibid. 
lo Ibid., p. 94. 
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son was aware of the distinction between group and wave velocity,7’ he did not 
apply it correctly. 
Ehrenhaft’s measurements of the charge of the electron which ‘demon- 
strated’ the existence of subelectrons, provide an illustration for a false set-up 
theory that resulted in an error.. Like Millikan, Ehrenhaft presupposed Stokes’ 
law to govern the fall of the particles. However, he used metal particles which 
were much smaller than the oil drops of Millikan, not to mention their 
irregular surface in contrast to the smooth surface of the droplets. Conse- 
quently, Stokes’ law was not applicable to the physical conditions Ehrenhaft 
had created, and his final result was in error.72 
Ehrenhaft declined to accept this objection and saw no reason why he 
should abandon Stokes’ law in its original form. He claimed that if 
the validity of the resistance law for small moving spheres of mercury and other 
material is to be doubted, then it cannot hold, either, for other substances, e.g. oil. 
The withdrawal of such a premiss would of course cut the ground away from the 
elementary quantum idea.. . as deduced from observations of electric charges on 
individual oil drops.73 
Ehrenhaft’s objections to Millikan’s work were logical and experimental; he 
argued that Millikan presupposed atomicity and invariably begged the ques- 
tion, and that Millikan’s experimental technique had not been sufficiently 
sensitive to detect fractions of what was considered the fundamental unit of 
electric charge. Ehrenhaft claimed that he had always found charges smaller 
than the charge of the electron, and that ‘this result does not depend upon any 
assumptions whatever as to atomicity of matter or electricity’.74 
Millikan, on his part, strongly advocated the view that Ehrenhaft’s results 
‘mean simply that he has assumed an incorrect law of movement of his minute 
charged particles through a gas’.75 
An interesting case of a’ false background theory which actually prevented 
the execution of what may be considered a correct idea for an experiment, 
occurs in the history of the experimental research into the phenomenon of 
light-pressure. In a paper delivered to the French Academy in 1731, J. J. 
Dortous de Mairan rightly remarked that all direct experiments which had 
been designed to detect this phenomenon were bedevilled by effects which the 
heat produced by the light had caused.76 Nevertheless, he did construct a 
sensitive pivoted mill of low friction which was extremely mobile, and trained 
on it the focus of a lens; but he still could not establish unambiguously the 
” Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
” For a detailed study and bibliography see Hon (1985), pp. 191-209; Chap.‘S: Case-Studies of 
Experiments. 
” Ehrenhaft (1925). n. 639. 
74 Ehrenhaft (1940), b. 385. 
” Millikan (1916b), p. 625. 
‘* Worrall (1982) p. 142. 
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phenomenon of light-pressure. Indeed, as the light was focused on one of the 
vanes, the ‘machine turned sometimes to one side, sometimes to the other’.” 
Mairan concluded correctly that these results were due to the heating of the air 
around the machine. Naturally, the next step would have been to perform the 
same experiment in a vacuum. Mairan was explicitly aware of this possibility, 
but refrained from carrying it out, deciding that he ‘need not give [himself] the 
trouble’.78 He was of the opinion that, 
there is in our atmosphere amongst that more gross air which we breathe and which 
does not at all penetrate glass, another more subtle air of some other fluid which 
penetrates glass.79 
In Mairan’s view, this more subtle air would lead, in these light-pressure 
experiments, to the same uncertain results. Being misled by this theory, Mairan 
did not pursue further the correct idea of executing this experiment in VUCUO.~~ 
The theory of the set-up may mislead in giving the impression that it governs 
different set-ups of the same type. A case in point is the experiments on the 
double scattering of electrons in the 1920s and thereafter. As Franklin and 
Howson point out, 
the electrons used in these experiments came from both p-decay and thermionic 
sources and physicists of the day believed that the type of source used made no 
essential difference. Later work, however, showed that P-decay electrons were 
longitudinally polarized while thermionic electrons were unpolarized, which resulted 
in significantly different experimental results.*’ 
However, theories can be irrelevant to the success of the experiment. 
Galileo, for example, did not have any theory to explicate the working of his 
telescope.8z 
2.2. Assumptions Concerning the Actual Set-up and Its Working 
Whereas the background-theory class focuses on the theoretical basis of an 
experiment, the second class is concerned with the actual process of setting up 
and operating the apparatus involved, that is, the hardware. One may charac- 
terize this second stage as the materialization of the theoretical requirements 
stipulated in the first stage; in other words, the nuts and bolts stage. 
In the process of constructing and setting up the various hardware required 
by the experiment, the experimenter makes numerous assumptions. The most 
” Quoted by Worrall, ibid., p. 143. 
l8 Ibid. 
l9 Ibid. 
so Worrall remarks that ‘Mairan seems here illicitly to be assuming, independently of experiment, 
that light does indeed exert a pressure - a fact in which, as a corpuscularist, he firmly believed. 
For, had he reperformed the experiment in vacua and found the erstwhile movement quelled then it 
would follow that this “more subtle air” could play no role in the phenomenon’. (Ibid.) 
8’ Franklin and Howson (1984) pp. 60-61; cf. Franklin (1979). pp. 247-248. 
82 Feyerabend (1979), Chaps. 9-l 1. 
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common of these is the assumption that the parts one has procured and their 
arrangement stand up to the required specifications and conditions. To be 
sure, it is possible to ascertain physically some of these assumptions by putting 
them to the test; however, since such tests involve further measurements, one 
has here a regressive sequence of measurements that for practical reasons must 
be truncated. Moreover, the experimenter has to ensure that the specifications 
are maintained while the experiment is carried out, or to allow for any change 
that may occur. Arising therefore in this class is the general type of error which 
originates in the belief that the set-up has met all the requirements, including 
the specified initial conditions, which, however, in point of fact it has not: the 
vacuum may be poor, the electric and magnetic fields may not be as uniform as 
expected, the insulation may not suffice, convection current or diffusion may 
occur. and so forth; the’experimental result may thus be misleading. 
The determination of the Hall effect which is of great interest in the theory 
of liquid metals abounds with such difficulties. An electric current is passed 
through a liquid metal (at a temperature of, say, 1OOO’C) in a strong transverse 
magnetic field. A very small voltage has then to be measured across the 
specimen. One can easily imagine the problems of containing the sample, 
maintaining it at a uniform temperature, avoiding convection currents and 
effects of magneto-hydrodynamic voltages, damping down vibrations, amplify- 
ing the signal, and so forth. As Ziman remarks, 
it is scarcely surprising that a decade of experimental work by several very accom- 
plished research workers has not produced an agreed set of data for this (in 
principle) basic and elementary physical parameter.83 
The study of the photoelectric effect presents another case. In 1899, J. J. 
Thomson successfully showed that the entities emitted in interactions of light 
with metal - including neutral metal plates - were the very same entities 
which made up the cathode rays.84 This result firmly confirmed the assumption 
that the photoelectric effect was due to interaction of light with the atomic or 
subatomic constituents of the metal surface. It thus provided a definite 
framework within which work on this effect could be carried on. Further 
experimental work gave J. J. Thomson the impression that increase in tempera- 
ture intensified the photoelectric action; the emission velocities of the ejected 
electrons appeared to be dependent on temperature. He therefore argued that 
the photoelectrons must be the free electrons of the metal as these particles 
partake in the energies of thermal agitation.85 
However, in 1907 Millikan and Winchester demonstrated conclusively that 
this result of J. J. Thomson, namely, that temperature affects the emission 
velocities of photoelectrons, was based on misleading experimental data: data 
83 Ziman (1978), p. 59. 
84 J J. Thomson (1899); Humphreys (1968), p. 46. 
” J J. Thomson (1902); Humphreys, ibid., pp. 47-48. 
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drawn from experiments conducted in air, rather than in a vacuum. Millikan 
and Winchester could not find in a careful survey of 11 metals any dependence 
of the photoelectric effect on temperature. This finding, coupled with Lenard’s 
discovery that the emission velocities of photoelectrons are independent of the 
intensity of the incident light, 86 led Millikan and Winchester to conclude that 
their result ‘constitutes very conclusive evidence that, if free electrons exist at 
all within metals, it is not these electrons which escape under the influence of 
ultra-violet light’.” In other words, J. J. Thomson’s result was in error. 
Another case in point is Hertz’s experimental study of cathode rays. In 1883, 
H. Hertz conducted experiments on cathode rays and failed to realize that due 
to poor vacuum the electric field which he had applied to a beam of cathode 
rays did not attain sufficient intensity. As a result. a distinct deflection of the 
cathode rays could not be detected. Hertz concluded his pioneering experiment 
by stating that 
the electrostatic and electromagnetic properties of the cathode rays are either nil or 
very feeble.88 
It is ironic that the prototype of the oscilloscope - for that is what Hertz’s 
apparatus amounted to - should be instrumental in demonstrating that 
cathode rays have no closer relation to electricity than has light produced by 
an electric lamp. Indeed, Hertz argued that since ‘cathode rays are electrically 
indifferent,. . . the phenomenon most nearly allied to them is light’.x9 
It took almost 15 years to show that Hertz was in error. When J. J. 
Thomson evacuated a cathode-ray tube more carefully and efficiently, he could 
see quite clearly - as the pressure was being reduced - how an electric field 
can deflect a beam of cathode rays; a deflection which earlier had escaped 
Hertz. The discovery of the electron, as is well known, took place with the 
advent of this experiment of Thomson.? 
N. de Lacaille (171331762) the meticulous French astronomer who mapped 
the southern skies, was troubled by the fact that the result of his geodetic 
survey in the vicinity of Cape Town supported the hypothesis that the earth is 
a prolate, not an oblate, spheroid. Although he partially rechecked the result, 
he could find no error and it remained a puzzle for some years. Apparently the 
result was due to the deviation of the plumb line at his southern station caused 
by the large mass of Table Mountain9’ 
In their 1965 review of the fundamental constants, Cohen and DuMond 
point out that there is a 17 km/s difference between the general region of values 
86 Lenard (1900, 1902). 
87 Millikan and Winchester (1907), p. 198; Humphreys (1968), p. 48. 
88 Hertz (1896), p. 254. For a detailed study see Hon (1987a). 
*9 Hertz, ibid. 
w J. J. Thomson (1897). 
y’ Gingerich (1973), p. 544. I am grateful to B. R. Goldstein for drawing my attention to this 
case. 
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obtained for c and the older result adopted in 1941 by R. T. Birge. The case of 
the 17 km/s discrepancy between the old Birge-recommended value of c and 
the newer values obtained by more modern methods of measurement has been 
described by Birge himself as one of the most astonishing systematic errors in 
the history of physics. Cohen and DuMond remark that 
the chief source of error in the older estimate came from a systematic error in the 
experimental result of Michelson, Pease and Pearson, performed in a mile-long 
evacuated tube laid on unstable soil near Santa Ana, California. Although some 
2885 replicated observations of the time of flight were made, there were only a few (2 
or 3) determinations of the distance. All the time measurements were made at night 
and the distances in the daylight. The site was near the ocean and variations in the 
results which seem correlated with the tides were observed.92 
Yet, no one knows for sure what caused the systematic error in this work. 
2.3. Observational Reports 
The preceding two stages constitute the foundation - in the abstract and 
the concrete sense - upon which the empirical programme can be brought to 
its completion, that is, knowledge through sense perception. The central 
feature of the third stage is thus the process of observation. It is at this stage 
that the contact, as it were, between the senses and the allegedly isolated 
‘world’ of the experiment is explicitly made. This contact may be at fault due 
to either misinterpretation of what has been otherwise correctly observed, or 
the limitation of the senses and their subjective nature. I call the former 
possible fault observational error, and the latter, for an historical reason - 
personal equation. 
An observational error occurs when the observer makes a correct observa- 
tion but fails to bring into consideration the external circumstances in which 
the observation took place; such a failure arises from misinterpreting the 
correct observation. These errors usually occur when the observer encounters a 
misleading situation of which he or she is not aware, and proceeds to interpret 
the otherwise correct observation without allowing for the misleading circum- 
stances. 
For example, were the experimenter to make a pointer reading, and should 
he or she ignore the gap between the pointer and the scale, then the reading 
might be in error due to the phenomenon of parallax. Another case in point is 
refraction: if one were to disregard this phenomenon, especially in astronomi- 
cal observations, one would not succeed in locating the actual position of the 
object one is observing. However accurate the observation’may be, one would 
inevitably determine the apparent position of the object concerned. In my 
terminology it would be an observational error if the observer were to consider 
the result of this observation the true position of the object. 
” IL R. Cohen and J. W. M. DuMond (1965), p. 550. 
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In the subclass of personal equation I subsume, in contrast to observational 
errors, those errors which originate in the limitation of the senses and their 
subjective nature. It was F. W. Bessel (17841846) - the famous mathema- 
tician and astronomer, the pioneer in the more exact measurements of modern 
astronomy - who conceived the notion of personal equation. Working in a 
period of great interest in errors of astronomical observation and their 
mathematical treatment,93 Bessel perceived, in 1816, the importance of the 
Kinnebrooke incident, and published an analysis of the case in 1822 - a 
publication which attracted immediate attention. 
The Kinnebrooke incident took place at Greenwich Observatory where, in 
January, 1796, the Astronomer Royal, N. Maskelyne (1732-l 811), dismissed 
his assistant, Kinnebrooke, for observing the times of stellar transits almost a 
second later than he himself had done. It should be stressed that the error was 
considered serious, since the calibration of the Greenwich clock depended 
upon such observations.94 
This event was recorded in the pages of the journal Astronomical Observa- 
tions at Greenwich,” and might have passed into oblivion had it not been for 
Bessel who saw its significance. Having studied the case, Bessel set himself the 
task of determining whether or not such a difference could be found amongst 
observers with more experience than Kinnebrooke. To his astonishment he 
found great differences which he presented in the form of the equation 
A -B= x sec. The difference between observer A and observer B was called the 
‘personal equation’.96 It was thus realized that even the most expert observers 
must allow themselves to be corrected by statistical averages from other 
observers. As R. L. Gregory points out, 
93 By 1816, both Laplace and Gauss had already published their seminal works on the . _ 
mathematical treatment of errors of observation. 
94 Maskelvne followed the Bradlev ‘eve and ear’ method which combines the audible beats of the 
pendulum clock with the perceptible-transit of a given star across the hair-line marking the 
meridian. In this method, as E. G. Boring reports, ‘the observer looked at the clock, noted the time 
to a second, began counting seconds with the heard beats of the clock, watched the star cross the 
field of the telescope, noted and “fixed in mind” its position at the beat of the clock just before it 
came to the critical wire, noted its position at the next beat after it had crossed the wire, estimated 
the place of the wire between the two positions in tenths of the total distance between the 
positions, and added these tenths of a second to the time in seconds that he had counted for the 
beat before the wire was reached. It is obviously a complex judgement’, Boring remarks. ‘Not only 
does it involve a coordination between the eye and the ear, but it requires a spatial judgement 
dependent upon a fixed position (the wire), an actual but instantaneous position of a moving 
object, and a remembered position no longer actual. Nevertheless, “the excellent method of 
Bradley” was accepted and regarded as accurate to one or at least two tenths of a second. In the 
face of this belief, Boring concludes, ‘Kinnebrooke’s error of eight tenths of a second was a gross 
error and justified Maskelyne’s conclusion that he had fallen “into some irregular and confused 
method of his own” and his consequent dismissal’. (Boring, 1950, p. 135; cf., Gregory, 1984. 
p. 212). 
91 Maskelvne (1799). 
y6 For Bessel’s‘discdvery, see Bessel (1823, 1826, 1836, 1876); cf. Boring (1950) pp. 136137, 150 
(Chap. 8: The Personal Equation); Gregory (1984) pp. 210-216. 
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for the first time in science, the average took over to correct the individual testimony 
of expert observers9’ 
By comparing directly and indirectly his observations with those of Struve, 
Bessel went further and showed that one could not reliably ‘calibrate the 
observer’ - the ‘personal equation’ being itself variable.9s Yet, the variability 
of the ‘personal equation’ was not so great as to render correction entirely 
useless. Bessel, for example, always observed in advance of Struve by an 
amount varying between 0.770 and 1.021 seconds.99 
During the 50 years since Bessel’s discovery of the phenomenon of ‘personal 
equation’, astronomers were much concerned with this problem and sought 
methods of correction and elimination. As it turned out, the emerging new 
discipline of experimental psychology gradually took hold of this issue, focus- 
ing its attention on explanation rather than on correction or elimination. 
Hermann von Helmholtz’s (1821-1894) measurement of the velocity of the 
nervous impulse in 1850, which demonstrated that nervous conduction is 
considerably slower than the speed of sound in air,lW and J. Hartmann’s 
(18 14-1876) experiment in 1858, which showed expectation and anticipation to 
be decisive elements of the ‘personal equation’,‘O’ gave much impetus to the 
study of this problem from physiological and psychological standpoints 
respectively. Furthermore, the development of the electromagnetic circuit 
made at that time the construction of chronographs practicable, and it became 
possible to determine what is called the ‘absolute personal equation’: the 
reaction time in making a movement as rapidly as possible after perceiving a 
signal with respect to a standard time measure, and not relative to the reaction 
time of another observer.‘O* 
The sources of error of the personal-equation type reside therefore either in 
the physiological condition of the observer’s senses, or in the observer’s mental 
state, or both. Examples of the former sources of error are colour blindness 
and slow reaction time, and of the latter - anticipation and hallucination. 
The distinction between observational errors and errors of the personal- 
equation type reflects the categorical differences between causes from without 
w Gregory, ibid., p. 213. 
98 Boring (1950) p. 137. 
99 Ibid., p. 138. Duhem remarked that ‘astronomers try to determine.. [the acuteness of the 
observer’s senses] in the mathematical form of a personal equation, but this equation partakes very 
little of the serene constancy of geometry, for it is at the mercy of a splitting headache or painful 
indigestion’. (Duhem, 1974, p. 162.) 
I” Helmholtz’s values are 42.9 and 25.0 m/s; they lie well within the range as determined by 
modern methods. Recent determinations give values for the velocity of the nervous impulse as high 
as 120 m/s for the largest nerve fibres and as low as 1 m/s for the smallest. For comparison, the 
speed of sound in air is about 330 m/s. (Boring, 1950, nn. 48. 144.) 
‘O’ Hartmann’s contribution was ‘very important s&e it demonstrated that the ‘personal 
equation’ is not simply a variable delay which can be explained physiologically, but that it also 
depends upon psychological elements. (Ibid., p. 145; Gregory, 1984, pp. 215-216.) 
lo* Boring, ibid., pp. 14@141, 147; Gregory, ibid., p. 215. 
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and causes from within. External circumstances can give rise to the possibility 
of committing an observational error, whereas one’s own physiological condi- 
tion and psychological make-up determine one’s personal equation. 
A historical case which clearly demonstrates the problem of psychological 
expectation and the limitation of the senses - both possible sources of error 
pertain to the subclass of personal equation - is the case of the canals of 
Mars. There is no item in the entire history of the telescopic observations of 
Mars which has been more widely proclaimed, more vehemently debated, and 
more abruptly forgotten than the canals. 
The first astronomer to observe this phenomenon, Schiaparelli of Milan, 
noted in 1877 that ‘there are on this planet, traversing the continents, long 
dark lines which may be designated as canali. . . Their arrangement appears to 
be invariable and permanent’.‘03 
The possibility that the intersecting dark lines which Schiaparelli had 
observed were literally canals, built by intelligent beings, was immediately 
taken up; it gave weight to the belief that there exists a highly developed 
civilization on Mars. One of the most energetic proponents of this theory was 
the American P. Lowell (1855-1916), who argued that the ‘intelligent crea- 
tures’ of Mars were living on an ageing, desert-like, planet whose water was 
trapped in the polar caps; hence the canals: an artificial device to transport 
water into the equatorial zones.‘04 
Lowell admitted that it is very difficult to see the canals. ‘Success’, he wrote, 
depends on the acuteness of the observer’s eye and upon the persistence with which 
he watches for the best moments in the steadier air.lo5 
Thus, he continued, 
not everybody can see these delicate features at first sight, even when pointed out to 
them; and to perceive their more minute details takes a trained as well as an acute 
eye, observing under the best conditions. When so viewed, however, the disk of the 
planet takes on a most singular appearance. It looks as if it had been cobwebbed all 
over. lo6 
Since it appeared that the whole planet was encompassed by the canals, Lowell 
suggested that the Martian community could act as a unit throughout its 
globe; he therefore argued that the community on Mars had an intelligent and 
non-bellicose character.“’ 
However, the critics argued that even an unbiased human eye would 
connect, under conditions of poor resolution, discontinuous blotches and 
lo3 Quoted by Mutch et al. (1976), p. 21. 
lW Ibid. 
‘OS Quoted by Mutch et nl., p. 23. 
Ia6 Ibid. A typical observational report on the canals of Mars can be found in: Nufure 84, (I 9 IO), 
172-173. 
lo7 Mutch et ul., ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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streaks into regular straight lines; and, secondly, since the effective resolution 
of the best telescopes is about 100 km on the Martian surface, Lowell’s claim 
to identifying canals of 50 km and less in width is simply not compatible with 
optical principles. The critics did not deny the visual effect of dark markings on 
the image of Mars; they objected, however, to identifying them, as narrow 
continuous lines, with actual Martian surface markings.los 
As late as 1962, Lowell Observatory published a photographic atlas of Mars, 
claiming to provide ‘each reader with the best possible opportunity to dis- 
tinguish the fine lines and to judge their reality [sic] for himself .‘09 
When the Mariner pictures arrived, it became clear that the critics’ point of 
view has been vindicated. The pictures obtained by the high resolution cameras 
aboard the spacecraft made it amply clear that no regular, linear elements of 
the size required by the canals theory were observable. It appears that poor 
resolution initiated a condition which facilitated a visual synthesis of dis- 
continuous elements; the interpretation of these elements as canals was sup- 
ported in turn by the belief that there is a Martian community. Thus, the 
observation of the canals was in error due to physical-physiological limitation 
as well as psychological expectation.“0 
Another interesting case which belongs to this category is the ‘discovery’ of 
the N rays by R. Blondlot. Blondlot, a well-known French physicist working at 
Nancy University, claimed to have discovered in 1903 a new form of radiation 
which he called N rays, after his university. The original method of detecting 
the N rays was to observe an electric spark which allegedly got brighter when 
subject to this radiation. Blondlot was confident that he could distinguish 
visually between the brightness of the sparks. Later on, he developed a special 
calcium sulphide screen whose phosphorescent glow increased markedly, so it 
was claimed, when it was exposed to N rays. Although the production of this 
effect and its cessation were not instantaneous, Blondlot claimed that amongst 
all the actions produced by N rays, this was the most easily observed.“’ 
Blondlot and his co-workers at Nancy established that there were many 
sources of N rays: artificial and natural, and they diligently proceeded in the 
most efficient manner to examine the properties of this new radiation. 
By the summer of 1903 the discovery of this new form of radiation became a 
major issue and many attempts were made to reproduce it. However, except in 
France, all the attempts to reproduce Blondlot’s results failed. 
Rlondlot argued that the N-ray phenomena 
lie almost at the limit of what. [the observers] are able to discern, and it is only 
after a certain amount of practice that they succeed in catching them easily, and in 
lo8 Ibid., p. 24. 
‘09 Quoted by Mutch et al., ibid. 
“O Ibid., p. 25. 
I” Blondlot (1905), pp. 22-23. For a detailed study and bibliography see Hon (1985), 
pp. 226-252; Chap. 5: Case-Studies of Experiments; cf., M. Jo Nye (1980). 
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observing them with complete certainty. The smallness of the effects and the delicacy 
of their observation must not deter us from a study which puts us in possession of 
radiations hitherto unknown.“* 
As more criticism mounted, the Revue ScientiJique polled leading scientists on 
their judgements concerning the existence of N rays. The editorial board 
announced that ‘it is time for French science to settle this question defi- 
nitely’.“3 
The strongest, and as it happened fatal, objection came from the American 
physicist, R. W. Wood. He paid a visit to Blondlot at his laboratory in Nancy, 
where he exposed Blondlot and his co-workers as the victims of 
autosuggestion.“4 
In reply, Blondlot affirmed that ‘the phenomena of N rays have for me the 
same certainty that other physical phenomena have. Several of my colleagues 
and a number of other persons say the same’.“* In his view, 
the observer should accustom himself to look at the screen just as a painter, and in 
particular an ‘impressionist’ painter, would look at landscape. To attain this requires 
some practice, and is not an easy task.‘16 
In fact, according to Blondlot some qeople never succeed in attaining these 
requirements. 
It is misleading to say with the critics of Blondlot that he was wrong in that 
the ultimate test was subjective. By definition, an observation is a subjective 
process; the problem lay rather in the nature of the observation: it was simply 
unamenable to objective, or rather inter-subjective criteria such as pointer 
reading or measurement of the length of a spark. To observe the N-ray effects 
one had to look for a small change in the brightness of a spark which needless 
to say required remembering brightness - a very imaginative task indeed. 
2.4. Theoretical Conclusions 
Having carried out the observations and the concomitant measurements, the 
experimenter arrives at the final stage of the study. To conclude the enquiry, 
that is, to obtain the final result, the experimenter analyses the data, and then 
incorporates the results of the analysis with an external theory so that the 
result can be put to use in either substantiating or refuting a theoretical claim, 
or laying an altogether new foundation. This is the goal of the experiment. 
Two processes are therefore involved in this final stage: firstly, there is the 
process of reduction, of analysing the data with a view to obtaining a coherent 
‘I* Blondlot, ibid., p. 37. 
‘I3 Revue Scientifique 2 ser. 5 (1904), 552. 
‘I4 Wood (1904). For another case of autosuggestion see Chadwick’s expost of Pettersson in the 
controversy over artificial disintegration. (Stuewer, 1985, especially pp. 284-289.) 
‘I5 Blondlot (1904). p. 621. 
‘I6 Blondlot (1905), pp. 82-83. 
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result; and, secondly, the process of spelling out the physical meaning of this 
result, 
It is in the first process that the mathematical theory of error is employed; 
indeed, it is onZy in the process of reduction that the mathematical procedures 
for treating errors come to the fore. And since the distinction between 
systematic and random errors is central to this analysis of error, it is here that 
this dichotomy is directly applicable. In this stage error may arise due to the 
inapplicability of the assigned distribution of random errors which is presup- 
posed in the mathematical analysis. Error may further occur in the process of 
assessing systematic errors - a process for which no clear set of rules exists. 
A fault in the second process, that is, the process of rendering the final result 
physically meaningful, may be due to two distinct causes. Such a fault may 
originate either in misunderstanding the physical result the experimenter has 
obtained, or in fallacious reasoning. The former fault is an error of interpreta- 
tion, whereas the latter is a logical mistake. In this subclass there are therefore 
sources of error and mistake which are located in the faculties of understand- 
ing and reasoning respectively. 
The discovery of the planet Uranus presents a clear illustration of this 
category of experimental error. On the night of the 13 March 1781, William 
Herschel noticed, in the course of a search for star pairs, a curious object which 
appeared to be in motion relative to nearby stars. He recorded in his notes that 
he had seen ‘a curious either nebulous star or perhaps a comet’. A few nights 
later he stated that what he had found ‘is a comet, for it has changed its place’. 
The possibility that the object was a planet - an interpretation which was 
compatible with the visual evidence - did not occur to Herschel initially. On 
the 26 April, Herschel reported his discovery to the Royal Society in a paper 
entitled ‘Account of a Comet’.“’ 
Notified of this discovery, astronomers attempted to determine the motion 
of the new body. Several attempts were made to compute a suitable parabolic 
(cometary) orbit as soon as a few observations had been accumulated. How- 
ever, it was quickly realized that each set of elements coincided with the 
observed positions for a few days and then rapidly diverged. The wasted 
efforts were due to one single reason: an uncritical acceptance of Herschel’s 
interpretation that the object was a comet. It was in the summer of that year 
that Herschel’s interpretation was rejected and the object he had discovered 
was reinterpreted as a planet: the planet Uranus.“x 
The few observations of Uranus did not suffice for accurate computations of 
its orbit. Seeking more observations, it occurred to Rode that Uranus might 
have been considered a star in possible earlier sightings. He therefore scruti- 
nized old astronomical catalogues with a view to finding Uranus recorded as a 
‘I’ Quoted by Grosser (1979), p. 19. 
‘18 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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star. He was indeed rewarded; he found two such sightings: in 1690 by 
Flamsteed and in 17.56 by Mayer. In the following years 16 more ‘preplane- 
tary’ observations of Uranus were discovered.“’ 
The planet Neptune was sighted for the first time as a planet by Galle who, 
on the basis of the predicted elements computed by Leverrier, searched for it in 
the right region in September 1846. However, Neptune had in fact been sighted 
by Lalande some 50 years earlier, but he had considered it a star. An 
examination of Lalande’s manuscript showed that he had made two observa- 
tions of the planet: on the 8 and 10 May 1795. Finding these two observations 
discordant, he had rejected one as probably in error, and marked the other as 
questionable. It is not unlikely that a re-examination of the region to see which 
observation was in error would have led Lalande to the discovery of the planet 
Neptune half a century before it was actually recognized as a planet. Indeed, 
the difference between the positions of these two sightings is given accurately 
by the now-known elements of Neptune’s orbit.“’ 
A subtle case of error of interpretation occurred in the experimental 
confirmation of Einstein’s equation of the photoelectric effect. In his presen- 
tation speech of Einstein’s Nobel Prize, Arrhenius made it clear that the Nobel 
Committee for Physics had chosen Einstein especially for his contributions to 
the quantum theory: his studies of specific heat and photoelectric effect.12’ 
Arrhenius declared in his speech that 
Einstein’s law of the photo-electrical effect has been extremely rigorously tested by 
the American Millikan and his pupils and passed the test brilliantly. Owing to these 
studies by Einstein the quantum theory has been perfected to a high degree.12’ 
A year later, in 1923, when Millikan was awarded the Nobel Prize ‘for his 
work on the elementary charge of electricity and on the photoelectric effect’,‘23 
the chairman of the Nobel Committee expressed the view that if Millikan’s 
studies of the photoelectric effect had given a different result, the photoelectric 
law of Einstein would have been without value; the chairman pointed out that 
Einstein received the prize after Millikan had confirmed the law experimen- 
tally.lz4 
The results of Millikan’s painstaking experimental work on the photoelectric 
effect’*’ did indeed establish the validity of Einstein’s equation, and, moreover, 
provided an accurate determination of Planck’s constant h. However, Millikan 
categorically rejected Einstein’s hypothesis of a light corpuscle of energy hv. In 
’ lD Ibid., pp. 24-26, 4@41. 
“” Ibid., pp. 115-l 17, 130~140; cf., Polanyi (1964), pp. 90-91, Humphreys (1968), pp. 3442 
U’ Nobel Lectures (1967). p. 479. 
I*? Ibid., p. 480. On the deliberation of the Nobel Committee see Pais (1983), pp. 502-512. 
I?’ Nobel Lectures (1965). p. 49. 
“’ Ibid., p. 53. 
‘E Millikan described the experimental arrangement as ‘a machine shop in vacua’. (Millikan, 
1916a, p. 361.) 
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his concluding paper on this work, Millikan opined that Einstein had put 
forward ‘the bold, not to say the reckless, hypothesis of an electro-magnetic 
light corpuscle of energy hv. ‘26 Millikan considered this hypothesis ‘reckless’ 
since, as he explained, 
an electromagnetic disturbance which remains localized in space seems a violation of 
the very conception of an electromagnetic disturbance, and second because it flies in 
the face of the thoroughly established facts of interference.lz7 
Although his experiments confirmed Einstein’s equation for the photoelectric 
effect, Millikan felt strongly that ‘the semi-corpuscular theory by which 
Einstein arrived at his equation seems at present to be wholly untenable’.12* 
Indeed, according to Millikan, despite the 
complete success of the Einstein equation, the physical theory of which it was 
designed to be the symbolic expression is found so untenable that Einstein himself, I 
believe, no longer holds to it.lz9 
By putting a different interpretation on Einstein’s confirmed equation,130 
Millikan found himself in a peculiar situation; as he remarked, 
we are in the position of having built a very perfect structure and then knocked out 
entirely the underpinning without causing the building to fall. It stands complete and 
apparently well tested, but without any visible means of support. These supports 
must obviously exist, and the most fascinating problem of modern physics is to find 
them. Experiment has outrun theory, or, better, guided by erroneous theory, it has 
discovered relationships which seem to be of the greatest interest and importance, 
but the reasons for them are as yet not at all understood.13’ 
The scepticism concerning Einstein’s light quantum hypothesis prevailed till 
about 1924. It was the discovery of the Compton effect that provided, together 
with the photoelectric effect, that ‘interlocking theoretical and experimental 
matrix’,lJ2 from which a concept such as the photon derives its validity. 
‘X Ibid., p. 355. 
In Ibid. 
i28 Ibid., p. 383. 
lz9 Ibid., p. 384. Pais traced this belief of Millikan to a remark Einstein had made in 1911 at the 
first Solvay congress. ‘I insist on the provisional character of this concept [light-quanta]‘, Einstein 
is reported to have said, ‘which does not seem reconcilable with the experimentally verified 
consequences of the wave theory.’ (Quoted by Pais, 1983, p. 383.) 
“O Millikan conceded that ‘the photoelectric effect. ., however it is interpreted, if only it is 
correctly described by Einstein’s equation, furnishes a proof which is quite independent of the facts 
of black-body radiation of the correctness of the fundamental assumption of the quantum theory, 
namely, the assumption of a discontinuous or explosive emission of the energy absorbed by the 
electronic constituents of atoms from ether waves. It materializes, so to speak, the quantity “h” 
discovered by Planck through the study of black-body radiation and gives us a confidence inspired 
by no other type of phenomenon that the primary physical conception underlying Planck’s work 
corresponds to reality’. (Millikan, 1916a, p, 385.) However, Millikan went on to develop a 
substitute for Einstein’s theory based largely on Planck’s theory. (Ibid., pp. 385-388; Millikan, 
1922, pp. 231-238.) An overview of the various interpretations of this effect can be found in 
Humphreys (1968), pp. 43-59; cf., Stuewer (1970). 
“‘Millikan (1922), p. 230. 
“* Stuewer (1970), p. 263. 
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In these cases the experimental and, for that matter, the observational data 
were correct and indeed significant. However, according to current theories the 
final results were in error due to erroneous interpretations of the data.‘33 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In this typology of experimental error I have distinguished and ordered 
according to an ideal chronology four different stages which are involved in 
executing an experiment. I have identified in each stage - a stage being in 
itself a category in the classification - possible sources of mistake and error 
that may impair the final result. The heuristic value of this typology, that is, 
the potentiality of this classification to elucidate experimental errors, has been 
illustrated by applying the classification to actual experiments in the history of 
physics. 
It is important to stress that underlying the distinctions embedded in the 
proposed classification there exist some outstanding philosophical issues. For 
example, the distinction between the category of background theory and the 
observational-reports category, is based on the assumption that a report of 
observation can be dissociated from any theoretical consideration: that, in 
principle, it is possible to have a description of a state of affairs which is not 
bound by any theory. This assumption is very problematic; indeed, it has been 
challenged by many students of philosophy of science. Hanson, for example, 
writes that ‘there is a sense. . in which seeing is a “theory-laden” undertaking. 
Observation of x is shaped by prior knowledge of .x’.‘~~ According to this view, 
an observational report necessarily contains an interpretation of what is seen; 
it is thus laden with a theory about the nature and explanation of what is seen. 
Richard L. Gregory, who studies perception, subscribes to the views of 
Hanson, 1. Lakatos and T. S. Kuhn in so far as they hold that observations 
and experimental tests are highly theory-laden. He is of the opinion that ‘a 
great deal has to be accepted before observations can be made at a11’.‘j5 
According to Gregory, 
the fact that vision is usually sufficient for immediate object identification distracts 
us from realizing the immense importance of contextual knowledge for reading data 
from signals. Scientific data from instruments are almost always presented with 
explicit collateral information on how the instrument was used, what source it was 
directed to, its calibration corrections and scale settings.lX6 
P. Feyerabend has argued from a different angle that the distinction between 
observational terms and theoretical terms is defunct. Although experience, as 
Feyerabend wants us to believe, has been discovered to arise ‘together with 
‘I3 For a detailed case-study of an error of interpretation see Hon, forthcoming. 
‘M Hanson (1979), p. 19. 
‘S Gregory (1984), p. 255. 
‘X Ibid., p. 397. 
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theoretical assumptions not before them’, and that ‘an experience without 
theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experi- 
ence’,13’ still, Feyerabend remarks, ‘the inference that the distinction between 
theory and observation has now ceased to be relevant, is either not drawn or is 
explicitly rejected’.13’ Feyerabend does not deny that such a distinction can be 
made; he simply does not see its purpose. As he is of the opinion that the 
distinction between theory and observation has ‘definitely lost its point’,‘39 he 
encourages us to take a step forward and ‘abandon this last trace of dogma- 
tism in science’!140 
However, in 1. Hacking’s view, all that Feyerabend has done is to show us 
‘how not to talk about observation, speech, theory, habits, or reporting’.14’ 
Hacking in fact dismisses the claim that observational reports always contain 
or assert theoretical assumptions, as ‘hardly worth debating because it is 
obviously false, unless one attaches a quite attenuated sense to the words, in 
which case the assertion is true but trivial’.‘42 He then puts forward a few 
examples from the history of science which he believes give substance to the 
view that observations, indeed important observations, have been made with- 
out any theoretical assumptions.‘43 
We should not be drawn here into this controversy;‘@ suffice it to note that 
there is a very great difference between asserting that all observational reports 
are ‘convention-laden’ and asserting that all observational reports are ‘theory- 
laden’. Following P. Alexander, I claim that in contrast to the former, the 
latter can be denied; consequently, it is possible to have observational reports 
which are neutral as between theories in general, and as between scientific 
theories in particular. All uses of language are necessarily ‘convention-laden’, 
but we can distinguish, within any set of conventions, between what is merely 
‘convention-laden’ and what is also ‘theory-laden’, so that descriptions which 
fall into the former class are, so to speak, pure, and that the distinction 
between description and interpretation, in at least one clear sense of those 
words, can be retained.‘45 
The critic of the method of experimentation - the philosopher of science 
who looks for possible faults in this method - must attain an external vantage 
point from which a critical outlook can be exercised. Distinguishing categories 
‘)’ Feyerabend (1979), p. 168 (emphases in the original). 
13X Ibid., p. 169. 
‘S Ibid., p. 168. 
I40 Ibid., p. 169. 
“’ Hacking (1983), p. 175. 
lo2 Ibid., p. 174. 
Ia3 Ibid., pp. 176-179. Hacking discusses this issue in his analysis of observation. (Ibid., Chap. 10: 
Observation; see also pp. 155-156.) 
ia For a detailed philosophical discussion see Hesse (1974), Chap. 1: Theory and Observation; 
cf., Gooding (1982), especially pp. 4648, and footnote no. 45. 
‘45 Alexander (1963). pp.88-89. 
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in the process of executing an experiment and identifying in each of these 
categories typical sources of mistake and error is one way of carrying out a 
critique of the method of experimentation. 
Acknowledgements - I wish to thank Heinz Post and Allan Franklin for helpful critical 
comments. An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at Oxford in 1982 to a BSPS 
conference on experimentation. 
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